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Section 167(a) of the Internal Revenue Code1 allows as a deduction for
depreciation2 a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion and wear and tear,
including obsolescence, of property used in a trade or business or of
property held for the production of income.3 Although the Code did not
specifically address the depreciation of intangible assets in the past,4 the
treasury regulations provided some guidance.5 The regulations allowed
depreciation for intangible assets if they were used in a business or in the
I I.R.C. § 167(a) (West Supp. 1994). References herein to the "Code" or
"section" are to the Internal Revenue Code.
2 Although the term "amortization" should be used for intangible assets, the
Code, regulations, and court decisions generally have used the term "depreciation."
3 Section 167 states:
(a) General rule-There shall be allowed as a depreciation deduction a
reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear (including a reasonable
allowance for obsolesence)-
(1) of property used in the trade or business, or
(2) of property held for the production of income.
I.R.C. § 167(a) (West Supp. 1994).
4 Intangible assets are those assets that lack a physical nature, but are instead
generally represented by physical evidence such as contracts and stock certificates.
Intangible assets allow the physical assets of a business to produce income, rather than
having any distinct value in themselves. 5 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION, § 23A.124 (1990).
5 Treasury Regulation § 1.167(a)-3 established the general rule regarding the
deductibility of intangibles:
If an intangible asset is known from experience or other factors to be of use
in the business or in the production of income for only a limited period, the length
of which can be estimated with reasonable accuracy, such an intangible asset may
be the subject of a depreciation allowance. Examples are patents and copyrights.
An intangible asset, the useful life of which is not limited, is not subject to the
allowance for depreciation. No allowance will be permitted merely because, in the
unsupported opinion of the taxpayer, the intangible has a limited useful life. No
deduction for depreciation is allowable with respect to goodwill.
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production of income for a limited period that can be estimated with
reasonable certainty. 6 Conversely, if an asset has a useful life that is not
limited, it is not depreciable. 7 The regulations state that depreciation
deductions are not allowable for goodwill.8 Courts have had to confront the
issue of determining whether an asset used in the production of income has
a limited useful life or whether it is simply a part of the goodwill of the
business.
The dispute has focused on whether customer-based intangible assets, 9
such as customer or subscriber lists, insurance expirations, 10 and core bank
deposits1' are depreciable. 12 Taxpayers have consistently argued that these
assets are depreciable. 13 The Internal Revenue Service has adopted the
position that because the value of these assets is dependent upon the
voluntary patronage of customers, it is indistinguishable from goodwill and
not depreciable. 14
Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1960).
61d.
71d.
8Id.
9 Customer-based intangibles can be described as a percentage of market share,
and any other value that results from the future provision of goods or services because
of relationships with customers in the ordinary course of business. 137 CONG. REC.
E2706, 2707 (daily ed. July 25, 1991) (statement of Rep. Rostenkowski).
10 Insurance expirations are lists that include information about currently insured
individuals, the dates on which their policies will expire, and the amount of their
insurance coverage. Rev. Rul. 74-456, 1974-2 C.B. 65. This information is used by
insurance agents to contact individuals when they are in need of new coverage.
11 Core bank deposits represent the income expected to be derived from accounts
presently held by the acquired bank. Citizens & S. Corp. v. Commissioner 91 T.C.
463, 465 (1988), aft'd, 919 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1990).
12 David G. Jaeger, Supreme Court Decides Newark Morning Ledger Co., 71
TAxEs 406, 406 (1993).
13 Id.; see, e.g., Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 555 (3d
Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 1670 (1993) (regarding the depreciation of newspaper
subscriber lists); Commissioner v. Seaboard Fin. Co., 367 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1966)
(considering depreciation of premium paid for purchase of small loan company);
AmSouth Bancorporation v. United States, 681 F. Supp. 698 (N.D. Ala. 1988)
(discussing the depreciation of core bank deposits); General Television, Inc. v. United
States, 449 F. Supp. 609 (D. Minn. 1978), aff'd per curiam, 598 F.2d 1148 (8th Cir.
1979) (involving the depreciation of cable television subscriber lists); Richard S.
Miller & Sons Inc. v. United States, 537 F.2d 446 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (discussing the
depreciation of insurance expirations).
14 Jaeger, supra note 12, at 406; see, e.g., Donrey, Inc. v. United States, 809
F.2d 534, 537 (8th Cir. 1987) (examining IRS argument that purchased subscription
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In critically examining the controversy surrounding the depreciation of
intangible assets, Part I of this Note explores the nature of goodwill. Part
II examines the tradition behind denying depreciation deductions for
goodwill. Part 1I of this Note analyzes the universally followed two-part
test set out in Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States15 for
determining when intangible assets are depreciable. Part IV evaluates the
varying applications of the Houston Chronicle test, which have resulted in
apparent inconsistencies and a corresponding circuit split. Part V
summarizes the reasoning of both the majority and the dissent in the
Supreme Court's attempt to resolve this split through its decision in
Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States.16 Part VI of this Note
evaluates the effects of the Newark Morning Ledger decision. Part VII
reviews and evaluates section 197,17 Congress' response to Newark
Morning Ledger.
I. THE NATURE OF GOODWILL
Although neither the Code nor the regulations defined "goodwill," 18
the revenue rulings provide some insight. Under revenue ruling 59-6019
goodwill is "the excess of net earnings over and above a fair return on the
net tangible assets." 20 Although this definition provides a good general
description of goodwill, it tells us little more than that goodwill is simply
the sum of intangibles of a business.
lists are inseparable from goodwill); Imperial News Co. v. United States, 576 F.
Supp. 865, 867 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 742 F.2d 1434 (2d Cir. 1984) (discussing IRS
claim that the probability of continued patronage that a magazine distributor acquired
when it purchased other distributors had an indeterminate useful life); Colorado Nat'l
Bankshares v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. 771, 787-90 (1990), aftd, 984 F.2d 383
(10th Cir. 1993) (evaluating IRS position that core bank deposits lack an ascertainable
value); Citizens & S. Corp. v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 463, 479-500 (1988), aft'd,
919 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1990) (considering IRS argument that purchased subscription
lists are inseparable from goodwill).
15 Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1129 (1974).
16 113 S. Ct. 1670 (1993).
17 I.R.C. § 197 (West Supp. 1994).
18 See Lawrence M. Dubin, Allocation of Costs to, and Amortization of,
Intangibles in Business Acquisitions, 57 TAXES 930, 931-32 (1979) (defining
goodwill).
19 Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, 241.
20 Id.
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The traditional definition of goodwill, articulated by Justice Story, is
more illuminating.
[G]oodwil [sic] may be properly enough described to be the advantage
or benefit, which is acquired by an establishment, beyond the mere value
of the capital, stock, funds, or property employed therein, in consequence
of the general public patronage and encouragement, which it receives from
constant or habitual customers, on account of its local position, or
common celebrity, or reputation for skill or affluence, or punctuality, or
from other accidental circumstances or necessities, or even from ancient
partialities, or prejudices. 2 1
Justice Story's definition illustrates that factors such as the successful
operation of a business for a long period of time, the prestige of the
business, and its reputation in the community are all components of
goodwill.
In order to completely appreciate the intangible nature of goodwill, it
should be contrasted with tangible items such as trademarks, tradenames,
patents, and copyrights, all of which are composed, to some extent, of
tangible items. 22 Goodwill is distinguishable from going concern value.23
Intangible factors, such as a long course of successful business dealings, a
prominent location, and a reputation for quality service, are merged into
the tangible items of trademark and tradename. 24 Consequently, the
intangible items that compose tangible trademarks and tradenames must be
severed from goodwill in order to arrive at an accurate valuation of
goodwill. 5
Goodwill that is the subject of a purchase and a sale is the result of the
antecedent business relations created by the seller and his former
customers. 26 For tax purposes, goodwill is characterized as the transfer of
an expectancy of continued earnings that exceeds the fair return produced
by only the tangible assets of the business. 27 Because goodwill must be
capable of being conveyed to the buyer, neither the personal qualifications
21 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 99 (1841); see
Metropolitan Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 149 U.S. 436, 446 (1893); Red Wing
Malting Co. v. Willcuts, 8 F.2d 180, 182 (D. Minn. 1925), aft'd, 15 F.2d 626 (8th
Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 763 (1927).
22 15 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 59.58 (1994).
23 5 id. § 23A.131 (1990).
24 15 id. § 59.58 (1994).
25 Id.
26 15 id. § 59.59.
27 Id.
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of the owner, nor an unusual demand for a product of the business
constitute goodwill. 28
Shorthand definitions of goodwill focus on the expectancy of the
continued patronage of customers. Goodwill is characterized by the
tendency of old customers to return to a familiar place of business. 29 As
one commentator has suggested, the "essence of goodwill is a preexisting
business relationship, based on a continuous course of dealing that may be
expected to continue indefinitely and is transferable to the buyer [of the
business]." 30
II. THE DENTAL OF THE DEPRECIATION DEDUCTION FOR GOODWILL
The historical basis for the law prohibiting the depreciation of goodwill
began with the Eighth Circuit's decision in Red Wing Malting Co. v.
Willcuts. 31 In Red Wing Malting, the taxpayer, a barley malt manufacturer,
had its market destroyed by prohibition and attempted to deduct the
obsolescence of goodwill on its 1918 tax return. 32 The Revenue Act of
191833 "limit[ed] the allowance for obsolescence to such property as is
susceptible to exhaustion, wear, and tear by use in the business. " 34 Even
assuming that goodwill was distinct from tangible property, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that because goodwill was not the type of
property that wears out or has an ascertainable life, it was not depreciable
under the 1918 Revenue Act. 35
28 Id.
29 See, e.g., Karan v. Commissioner, 319 F.2d 303, 306 (7th Cir. 1963) (noting
that goodwill has been defined as the probability that "'old customers will resort to the
old place' without contractual compulsion") (quoting Brooks v. Commissioner, 36
T.C. 1128, 1133 (1961)); Nelson Weaver Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 897,
901 (5th Cir. 1962) (describing goodwill as a long-standing relationship with a
satisfied clientele); Boe v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1962) (stating
that the "essence of good will is the expectancy of continued patronage, for whatever
reason"); Burke v. Canfield, 121 F.2d 877, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (defining goodwill
as essentially the tendency of customers to return for trade to those with whom they
are accustomed to dealing); Computing & Software, Inc. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C.
223, 233 (1975) (stating that the essence of goodwill is a pre-existing business
relationship).
30 Dubin, supra note 18, at 931.
31 15 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 763 (1927).
32 1d. at 627.
33 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 234(a)(7), 40 Stat. 1057, 1078 (1919).
34 Red Wing Maling Co., 15 F.2d at 633.
35 Id.
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In Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Co. v. Clarke, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals addressed facts almost identical to those in Red Wing
Malting, but held that goodwill was depreciable under the 1918 Revenue
Act. 36 The court viewed goodwill as an owner's privilege of continuing to
deal with established customers, noting that goodwill can only exist when
it is connected to an ongoing business. 37 The Prohibition legislation that
cut short the use of tangibles in businesses that manufactured or sold
alcohol also necessarily limited the life of goodwill.38 Goodwill was
subject to obsolescence and thus depreciable. 39
Because of the circuit split, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.40 In
a short, sharply worded opinion, the Court prohibited the depreciation of
goodwill. 41 The Court based its decision on congressional intent42 rather
than on sound accounting principles.
The constitutional amendment prohibiting alcohol was ratified by the
states prior to the time that the Revenue Act of 1918 was passed by
Congress. 43 The Court reasoned that congressional intent in passing the
Revenue Act could not have been to provide tax abatements, in the form of
depreciation for goodwill, to businesses that were being extinguished
because they constituted a noxious use.44 It is on these tenuous grounds
that the denial of the depreciation deduction for goodwill is based.
Cases subsequent to Clarke denied depreciation for goodwill on the
basis of the "mass-asset" rule.4 5 Courts have reasoned that when a going
business is purchased the purchase price paid for the customers' contracts,
taken in the aggregate, constitutes an intangible capital asset because these
36 Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Co. v. Clarke, 30 F.2d 219, 222 (2d Cir.
1929), rev'd, 280 U.S. 384 (1930).
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Clarke v. Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Co., 280 U.S. 384, 385 (1930).
41 Id. at 386-87.
42Id. at 387.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 386-87.
45 See Golden State Towel & Linen Serv. v. United States, 373 F.2d 938, 944
(Ct. Cl. 1967) (reasoning that a purchased customer list is an indivisible business
property because the whole is equal to the sum of its fluctuating parts at any given
time); General Television, Inc. v. United States, 449 F. Supp. 609, 611-12 (D. Minn.
1978), aff'd per curiam, 598 F.2d 1148 (8th Cir. 1979) (concluding that cable
subscriber lists that were actually customer structures with the expectancy of continued
patronage rather than lists of potential customers constituted an indivisible
nondepreciable asset).
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contracts are self-regenerating. 46 Under this rule, goodwill is characterized
as a self-regenerating asset; the expiring components (customers) are
replaced through time so that the asset's value remains relatively
constant. 47 Courts that have adhered to the mass-asset rule have generally
held that customer-based intangibles, such as subscription lists, are so
intertwined with goodwill (if not equivalent to goodwill itself) that they are
per se nondepreciable. 4s
IlH. HOUSTON CHRONICLE AND ITS PROGENY
In Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States,49 the Fifth
Circuit explicitly rejected the mass-asset rule in favor of a two-part test for
determining the depreciability of intangibles.50 In Houston Chronicle, the
taxpayer had acquired all of the assets of a competing newspaper, including
subscription lists. 51 A valuation study established the value of the
subscription lists by estimating the number of subscribers that would have
become Houston Chronicle subscribers on the closing of the former paper,
46 Mark Wertlieb et al., The Amortization of Purchased Intangible Assets, 1993
TAX ADVISER 583, 584.
47 Id.
48 This general approach was reflected in Golden State Towel & Linen Serv. v.
United States:
[A] purchased terminable-at-will type of customer list is an indivisible
business property with an indefinite, nondepreciable life, indistinguishable from-
and the principal element of-goodwill, whose ultimate value lies in the
expectancy of continued patronage through public acceptance. It is subject to
temporary attrition as well as expansion through departure of some customers,
acquisition of others, and increase or decrease in the requirements of individual
customers. A normal turnover of customers represents merely the ebb and flow of
a continuing property status in this species, and does not within ordinary limits
give rise to the right to deduct for tax purposes the loss of individual customers.
The whole is equal to the sum of its fluctuating parts at any given time, but each
individual part enjoys no separate capital standing independent of the whole, for
its disappearance affects but does not interrupt or destroy the continued existence
of the whole.
373 F.2d 938, 944 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
49 Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1129 (1974).
5 0 1d. at 1249-50.
51 Id. at 1243.
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multiplied by the average cost of obtaining a new subscriber.5 2 Because the
taxpayer had no intentions of continuing publication of the purchased
newspaper, the court stated that the subscription lists were not self-
regenerating. 53 The only value of the lists to the taxpayer was to provide
names and addresses of potential subscribers. 54
Although the Service argued that the lists were not depreciable as a
matter of law because they were inextricably linked to goodwill, the court
rejected this argument. 55 The court held that the taxpayers were entitled to
depreciation deductions upon satisfaction of a two-part test.56 First, the
taxpayer must prove that the intangible asset has an ascertainable value that
is separate and distinct from goodwill.57 Second, the asset must have a
limited useful life whose length can be determined with reasonable
certainty.58
In response to the Fifth Circuit's Houston Chronicle decision, the
Service articulated its official position regarding the depreciation of
intangible assets in Revenue Ruling 74-456. 59 In this ruling, the Service
stated that the depreciability of intangible assets such as customer and
subscription lists is a factual test, met only if the two-part Houston
Chronicle test is satisfied. 60  Generally, however, customer-based
intangibles are not depreciable because they are either in the nature of
goodwill or have lives of indeterminate length. 6'
As a consequence of both the Fifth Circuit's Houston Chronicle
decision and the Service's subsequent Revenue Ruling, the test for the
depreciabiity of intangible customer-based assets was reduced to a factual
inquiry as to whether the asset: (1) had an ascertainable value separate and
distinct from goodwill, and (2) had a limited useful life that could be
computed with a reasonable degree of accuracy. Although many courts
have applied this test, they have reached different outcomes, depending on
both how they have defined "goodwill" and which aspects of the two-part
test they have emphasized. 62
52 Id. at 1243-44.
53 Id. at 1244.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 1249-50.
56 Id. at 1250.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Rev. Rul. 74-456, 1974-2 C.B. 65.
60 Id. at 66.
61 Id.
62 Jaeger, supra note 12, at 408.
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IV. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT IN THE APPLICATION OF
THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE TEST
The application of the Houston Chronicle test to different fact patterns
illustrates the varying results that courts have reached. In Citizens &
Southern Corp. v. Commissioner,63 the taxpayer acquired nine banks, and
sought to depreciate the banks' deposit bases. 64 Because these deposit bases
had a definite value and their useful lives could be ascertained with
reasonable accuracy, the taxpayer argued that the deposit bases were
depreciable.65 The Tax Court determined that studies done by the taxpayer,
which estimated the percentage of accounts that would close over a given
period of time, established the useful life of the deposits. 66 Under the
Houston Chronicle test, the taxpayer had proven that the deposit base had
an ascertainable cost separate and distinct from the goodwill of the
acquired banks.67
The Tax Court reached the same result in Colorado National
Bankshares, Inc. v. Commissioner.68 The court specifically held that core
bank deposits could be valued directly and had limited lives that were
measurable with a reasonable degree of accuracy. 69 Consequently, the
assets were separate from goodwill, 70 entitling the taxpayer to depreciate
them.
In contrast to the holdings in Citizens & Southern Corp. and Colorado
National Bankshares, other courts, under similar facts, have disallowed
depreciations for core bank deposits. In AmSouth Bancorporation v. United
States,71 AmSouth Bancorporation acquired the assets and assumed the
liabilities of the Bank of East Alabama (BEA).72 In applying the traditional
definition of goodwill (the expectancy of continued patronage), the district
court held that BEA had goodwill and that the plaintiff had not met its
burden of proving that the customer deposit base had a value separate and
63 91 T.C. 463 (1988), aff'd, 919 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1990).
64 Id. at 464. "Deposit base" describes "the intangible asset that arises in a
purchase transaction representing the present value of the future stream of income to
be derived from employing the purchased core deposits of a bank." Id. at 465.
65 Id. at 498-505.
66 Id. at 505.
67 Id.
68 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 771 (1990), aftd, 984 F.2d 383 (10th Cir. 1993).
69 Id. at 789.
70 Id.
71 681 F. Supp. 698 (N.D. Ala. 1988).
7 2 Id. at 699.
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distinct from the goodwill of BEA.73 The deposits of BEA's customers
served as the point of contact with its customers; therefore, the relationship
was inseparable from goodwill.74
In Banc One Corp. v. Commissioner,75 the court examined a fact
pattern almost identical to that presented in Citizens & Southern Corp. The
court employed a residual definition of goodwill: Goodwill is the value that
remains after accounting for assets with ascertainable values and
determinable useful lives.76 Consequently, the court held that the taxpayer
was not entitled to a depreciation deduction for the deposit bases.77
The controversy regarding the depreciation of intangible assets is not
confined to bank deposits. In Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United
States,78 the taxpayer sought to depreciate a portion of the purchase price
of eight newspapers as allocated to an intangible asset called paid
subscribers. 79 After determining that the taxpayer had demonstrated that
paid subscribers had both a useful life and a value separate and distinct
from goodwill, the District Court of New Jersey held that the taxpayer was
entitled to an amortization deduction.80 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed, however, holding that some intangibles "notwithstanding that
they have wasting lives that can be estimated with reasonable accuracy and
ascertainable values, are nonetheless goodwill and nondepreciable." 8' The
court stated that the taxpayer had not satisfied its burden of proving that
paid subscribers were separate and distinct from goodwill.82
In Donrey, Inc. v. United States,83 the Eighth Circuit was faced with
almost identical facts to those in Newark Morning Ledger, but reached a
contrary result. The taxpayer sought to depreciate the subscription list of a
newspaper that it had purchased. 84 The Service argued that because the
purchased subscription list was inseparable from goodwill, it was not
depreciable as a matter of law. 85 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
73 Id. at 719.
74 Id. at 719-20.
75 84 T.C. 476 (1985), aft'd, 815 F.2d 75 (6th Cir. 1987).
76 Id. at 502.
7 7 Id.
78 734 F. Supp. 176 (D.N.J. 1990), rev'd, 945 F.2d 555 (3d Cir. 1991), rev'd,
113 S. Ct. 1670 (1993).
79 Id. at 177.
80 Id. at 180-85.
81 945 F.2d at 568.
82 Id.
83 809 F.2d 534 (8th Cir. 1987).
8 4 Id. at 535.
85 Id.
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rejected the Service's argument and instead held that the subscription list
was depreciable because it had an ascertainable value and a determinable
useful life.86
One central point should be apparent from the contrasting positions
reached by courts regarding the depreciation of intangibles. Because no
standard or generally accepted definition of "goodwill" exists, courts have
applied different definitions, and correspondingly, have reached different
results. All of these courts have attempted to draw the fine, and perhaps
artificial, line between goodwill and other intangibles, but instead have
created confusion, inconsistency, and uncertainty.
V. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN NEWARK MORNINGLEDGER
The split among the circuits regarding the application of the two-part
Houston Chronicle test to customer-based intangibles was resolved in
Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States.87 In a 5-4 decision, the
Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit and held for the taxpayer.88 The
majority8 9 began its analysis by characterizing goodwill as "'the
expectancy of continued patronage. '"' 90 Although this definition provides a
good shorthand way in which to view goodwill, the court noted that this
definition tells us nothing about whether an asset is depreciable.91 The
value of every intangible asset is related, to some extent, to the expectation
that customers will continue their patronage. 92 Hence, the cornerstone of
the Court's decision did not rest on its characterization of goodwill.
The majority held that if a taxpayer can prove with reasonable accuracy
that an asset which will be used in a business has value that wastes over an
ascertainable period of time, the asset is depreciable under section 167. 93
86 Id. at 537.
87 113 S. Ct. 1670 (1993), rev'g, 945 F.2d 555 (3d Cir. 1991). For a discussion
of the factual background and the lower court decisions in this case, see supra text
accompanying notes 78-82.
88 Id. at 1683.
89 Justice Blackmun, the author of the majority opinion, was joined by Justices
Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas. Id. at 1671.
90 Id. at 1675 (quoting Boe v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir.
1962)).
91 Id. at 1676 n.9.
92 Id. at 1675-76.
93 Id. at 1680-81. Justice Blackmun stated that the majority opinion does not alter
the prohibition in Treasury Regulation § 1.167(a)-3 against depreciating goodwill. Id.
at 1680 n.13. Instead, the Court interpreted the Regulation so that any asset that has a
limited useful life and an ascertainable value is by definition not goodwill. Id. The
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The fact that the asset's value may be related to the expectancy of
continued patronage is not relevant. 94 The key inquiry is whether the asset
can be valued and whether that value diminishes through time.95 The Court
downplayed the first prong of the Houston Chronicle test in favor of a
more analytic approach that focused on the valuation of the asset, not
whether it was separable from goodwill.
In discussing the appropriate burden of proof for the taxpayer in
attempting to depreciate intangibles, the Court noted that the taxpayer's
burden will be a high one, which will often be too difficult to bear.96 The
taxpayer's burden in the present case was substantially lightened by the fact
that the government agreed to the stipulated useful lives assigned by the
taxpayer's experts to the paid subscribers. 97 The taxpayer successfully
argued that the assets in question were not self-regenerating, but waste
over time because the subscriptions are canceled over a relatively
predictable period. 98 Using generally accepted statistical principles, the
taxpayer was able to prove that the asset consisted of identifiable
components, subscriptions, each of which had lives of limited duration. 99
Regarding the issue of valuation, the taxpayer argued that the fair
market value of the paid subscriber lists was $67.8 million.'0o In applying
the income approach to valuing this asset, the taxpayer "comput[ed] the
present value of the after-tax subscription revenues to be derived from the
'paid subscribers,' less the cost of collecting those revenues, and adding
the present value of the tax savings resulting from the depreciation of the
'paid subscribers.'" 10 1 The court rejected the government's approach to
valuation because the government merely took as its value the cost of
generating a similar list.102 Because the list of subscribers involved herein
had subscribed to the newspaper over a long period of time, they
represented a predictable source of future revenue. 103
Court limited its inquiry to the facts with which it was presented to hold that the "paid
subscribers" list was depreciable. Id.
94 Id. at 1680-81.
95 Id. at 1680.
96 Id. at 1681.
97 Id. In fact, the Court noted that the government chose to rest its entire case on
legal arguments rather than challenging the evidence the taxpayer had produced. Id. at
1681-82 n.14. In short, the Court stated that the government lost this case at trial. Id.
98 Id. at 1681.
99 Id.
1)O Id. at 1682.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
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In an opinion authored by Justice Souter, 1°4 the dissenting Justices
argued that under the traditional definition of goodwill as "the expectation
of continued patronage," the alleged asset that the taxpayer deemed "paid
subscribers" was simply the goodwill associated with these subscribers.105
Justice Souter argued that the majority had incorrectly viewed goodwill as
the residual asset whose value is determined by the business's purchase
price minus the identifiable assets that have determinable lives. 1°6 The
majority had reduced the concept of goodwill to nothing more than an
"accounting leftover," according to the dissenting Justices. 107
The dissent also criticized the majority's arguments because the
evidence presented by the taxpayer regarding the useful lives of the paid
subscribers was vulnerable to attack.108 The flaws in the taxpayer's
methods prevented the useful lives from being measured with any degree of
certainty.1°9 The insufficiency of the evidence alone should have been
enough to deny the taxpayer's depreciation deduction.110
VI. THE EFFECTS OF NEWARK MORNING LEDGER
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Newark Morning Ledger
may be interpreted as standing for the proposition that all customer-based
intangibles, and more specifically customer lists, are depreciable, it is
unlikely that this case would have had much precedential value. The
narrow 5-4 decision, the Service's error in failing to contest the taxpayer's
expert evidence, and the Service's stipulation to the estimates of the useful
lives of the "paid subscribers" of each newspaper, lead one to believe that
if the Service had chosen a different litigation strategy, a contrary result
may have been reached."'
104 Justice Souter was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and
Scalia. Id. at 1683.
105 Id. at 1684.
106 Id. at 1684-85.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 1686.
109 Id. at 1686-89.
110 Id. at 1686.
111 George Brode, Jr., Structuring Taxable Acquisitions of Intangibles Under
Section 197, 60 TAx NOTEs 1011, 1016 (1993).
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The Court's discussion of the application of the mass-asset rule is
vulnerable to criticism.112 According to the majority, the mass-asset rule
"provides that certain kinds of intangible assets are properly grouped and
considered as a single entity; even though the individual components of the
asset may expire or terminate over time, they are replaced by new
components, thereby causing only minimal fluctuations and no measurable
loss in the value of the whole." 113 The mass-asset rule does not permit the
depreciation of certain customer-based intangibles because they are self-
regenerating assets. 114
The majority stated that the mass-asset rule "continues to guide the
decisions of the Tax Court with respect to certain intangible assets." 115
The court cited Ithaca Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner16 as an example
that the mass-asset rule retains its vitality. 117 The majority opinion may be
read as requiring the taxpayer, in order to meet its burden of proof, to
establish why the mass-asset rule does not apply to intangible assets other
than those that are customer-based. 118 Consequently, the decision may have
an adverse impact on those taxpayers who seek to depreciate non-customer-
based intangible assets.
By rejecting the traditional definition of goodwill, the Court shifted the
focus from distinguishing between intangible assets and goodwill to valuing
the assets. Recall that the key inquiry is whether assets can be valued and
whether that value diminishes over time. 119 The implication of this
approach is that asset valuation and useful life, not the nature of the
intangible asset, are controlling.120
112 George L. Middleton, Jr. & Christian M. McBurney, The Morning After
Newark Morning Ledger: What Should Taxpayers Do Now?, 59 TAX NOTES 817, 821
(1993).
113 Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670, 1676 (1993).
114 Id.
115 Id. at 1677.
116 97 T.C. 253 (1991), aft'd, 17 F.3d 684 (4th Cir. 1994). In this case, the
taxpayer sought to depreciate the value allocated to the trained work force of a
purchased going concern over the length of time each employee remained with the
purchasing company. Id. at 261. The court emphasized that whether an assembled
work force is an intangible asset with an ascertainable value and a limited useful life
separate from goodwill is a question of fact. Id. at 263-64. The court held that the
mass-asset rule applied to prohibit the depreciation of the cost of acquiring the
assembled work force. Id. at 267.
117 Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1677-78.
118 Middleton, supra note 112, at 821.119 Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1680.
120 See id.
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The result is that rather than settling the dispute, the Supreme Court
may merely have shifted its focus. The Court applied the Houston
Chronicle approach with one exception. 121 By implicitly rejecting the first
prong of the Houston Chronicle test, the court indicated that the
ascertainable value of the asset need not be shown to be separate and
distinct from goodwill.
The Court was left at the mercy of the valuation experts, because it
focused on the value of the asset. So long as an intangible asset beyond the
identifiable tangible assets of a business can be shown to have value which
wastes over time, depreciation of the intangible asset is apparently
permissible.
The Newark Morning Ledger decision also has a number of
implications on tax policy. First, the decision provides some insight into
the appropriate valuation method for customer-based intangibles. 122 The
Court rejected the cost method of valuation 123 in favor of the income
method' 24 as the appropriate means for determining the value of an
intangible asset. 125 The approval of the income valuation method is a
benefit for taxpayers because it permits much larger depreciation
deductions than the cost method. 126 In Newark Morning Ledger, for
example, the income method produced a value of $67 million for the
subscriber lists, while the cost method produced a value of only $3
million. 127
Second, the Service could get more aggressive with certain taxpayers
by reducing the basis of their intangible assets in the year in which they are
sold, by the amount of allowable depreciation not actually claimed by
taxpayers in preceding years. 128 Under section 1016(a)(2) of the Code, the
amount of a taxpayer's basis may be reduced by the amount of depreciation
allowed or allowable in prior years. 129 Depreciation "allowable" pertains
121 For a more detailed discussion of the Houston Chronicle test, see supra text
accompanying notes 49-58.
122 Jaeger, supra note 12, at 413.
123 The cost method for valuing an intangible asset determines the cost of
creating a similar intangible asset. See Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1682.
124 The income method for valuing an intangible asset determines the present
value of the revenues to be derived from the asset, taking into consideration the cost
of collecting those revenues and taxes. Id.
125 Jaeger, supra note 12, at 413.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Middleton, supra note 112, at 823.
129 Id.
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to depreciation that should have been allowed in prior taxable years on the
basis of facts that should have been reasonably known at that time. 130
Although the Newark Morning Ledger decision provided some
guidance to taxpayers regarding the depreciation of intangible assets, it is
far from decisive on the issue. Instead of providing a principled distinction
between intangible assets and goodwill, the Court permitted the resolution
of depreciation disputes to remain contingent upon the particular facts of
each case. Rather than completely resolving the issue, the Court's decision
encouraged taxpayers to pursue creative valuation techniques and employ
better experts, potentially leading to increased litigation. The decision sent
a message to the Service that it should more aggressively contest the
valuation techniques of taxpayers' experts, or litigate depreciation
deductions that should have been taken by taxpayers in prior years, to
work a reduction in basis and increase revenue.
VII. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
Because of the uncertainty that remained after the Newark Morning
Ledger decision, Congress took legislative action on August 10, 1993.
Section 13261(a) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
enacted new section 197 of the Internal Revenue Code, which changes the
tax treatment of intangible assets. 13 1 As a result, many of the unresolved
issues that remained after Newark Morning Ledger have been clarified.
Section 197 permits the cost of most intangible assets acquired after the
date of enactment to be amortized over a fifteen-year period. 132 The most
130 Treas. Reg. § 1.1016-3(a)(1)(ii) (1960).
131 Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13261(a), 107 Stat. 312, 532 (1993).
132 I.R.C. § 197. This Code section provides, in relevant part:
SEC. 197. AMORTIZATION OF GOODWILL AND CERTAIN OTHER INTANGIBLES
(a) GENERAL RULE.-A taxpayer shall be entitled to an amortization
deduction with respect to any amortizable section 197 intangible. The amount of
such deduction shall be determined by amortizing the adjusted basis (for purposes
of determining gain) of such intangible ratably over the 15-year period beginning
with the month in which such intangible was acquired.
(b) No OTHER DEPRECIATION OR AMORTIZATION DEDUCTION ALIOWABE.-
Except as provided in subsection (a), no depreciation or amortization deduction
shall be allowable with respect to any amortizable section 197 intangible.
(c) AMORTIZABLE SECTION 197 INTANGMLE. For purposes of this section-
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important aspect of new section 197 is that it includes acquired goodwill
and going concern value as amortizable intangible assets. 133 Premiums that
(1) IN GENERAL-Except as otherwise provided in this section, the term
"amortizable section 197 intangible" means any section 197 intangible-
(A) which is acquired by the taxpayer after the date of the enactment of this
section, and
(B) which is held in connection with the conduct of a trade or business or an
activity described in section 212.
(2) EXCLUSION OF SELF-CREATED INTANGIBLES, etc.-The term "amortizable
section 197 intangible" shall not include any section 197 intangible-
(A) which is not described in subparagraph (D), (E), or (F) of subsection
(d)(1), and
(B) which is created by the taxpayer.
This paragraph shall not apply if the intangible is created in connection with
a transaction (or series of related transactions) involving the acquisition of assets
constituting a trade or business or substantial portion thereof.
I.R.C. § 197 (West Supp. 1994).
133 I.R.C. § 197. Subsection (d) provides, in relevant part:
(d) Section 197 intangible.-For purposes of this section-
(1) In general.-Except as otherwise provided in this section, the term section
197 "intangible" means-
(A) goodwill,
(B) going concern value,
(C) any of the following intangible items:
(i) workforce in place including its composition and terms and conditions
(contractual or otherwise) of its employment,
(ii) business books and records, operating systems, or any other information
base (including lists or other information with respect to current or prospective
customers),
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had been paid in taxable acquisitions over the fair market value of the
target's tangible assets that previously could not be written off can now be
depreciated over a fifteen-year period.134 Disputes will no longer turn on a
factual test that permits apparent inconsistencies. The depreciation of
intangibles may now be simpler and allow for more predictable results. 135
The revision will prevent the squandering of financial resources on
litigation costs. 136 Under the facts and circumstances test, those with
greater financial resources to hire better valuation experts were more likely
to prevail than those who had fewer resources. 137 The government will no
longer be forced to hire costly valuation experts to compete with private
corporations. Insofar as revised section 197 has removed the dispute from a
facts and circumstances test, it may also have leveled the playing field so
that taxpayers in similar situations are treated equally.
A major revision in the Code will usually have significant ramifications
for both taxpayers and the courts, and the enactment of new section 197 is
no exception. Because of the enactment of the revision, the Service is being
forced to settle pre-1993 cases. 138 In fact, the Conference Agreement 139
strongly urged the Service to settle these cases, stating:
The severe backlog of cases in audit and litigation is a matter of great
concern to the conferees; and any principles established in such cases will
no longer have precedential value due to the provision contained in the
conference agreement. Therefore, the conferees urge the Internal Revenue
Service ... to expedite the settlement of cases under present law. In
considering settlements and establishing procedures for handling existing
(iii) any patent, copyright, formula, process, design, pattern, knowhow,
format, or other similar item,
(iv) any customer-based intangible,
(v) any supplier-based intangible, and
(vi) any other similar item ....
I.R.C. § 197 (West Supp. 1994).
134 Brode, supra note 111, at 1017.
135 See Marc D. Levy et al., Supreme Court's Decision on Amortizing Intangibles
Removes One Barrier, 79 1. TAx'N 4, 8 (1993).
136 Middleton, supra note 112, at 826.
137 See id. at 827.
138 Wertlieb, supra note 46, at 589-90.
139 H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 103-213, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 696 (1993), reprinted
in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1088, 1385.
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controversies in an expedited and balanced manner, the conferees strongly
encourage the Internal Revenue Service to take into account the principles
of the bill so as to produce consistent results for similarly situated
taxpayers. 140
Under prior law, the Service is challenging approximately $8 billion of
amortization deductions. 141 At a 34% corporate tax rate, a potential
windfall of $2.7 billion for taxpayers would result if they were not taxed
on these potential amortization deductions. 142 Although it is not clear by
what amount taxpayers would benefit if settlements were reached, whatever
the settlement policy, it will have major implications for the Treasury. 143
Hence, whatever strategy the Service pursues with regard to reconciling
amortization deductions under prior law, significant controversy will likely
result.
Some taxpayers will also be subjected to adverse consequences as a
result of the revision in section 197.144 Taxpayers claimed deductions had
calculated useful lives that ranged from 6.3 to 10.6 years for $8 billion
worth of disputed intangibles. 145 The median of these two extremes is 8.4
years, which is significantly less than the fifteen-year amortization period
required by revised section 197.146 Taxpayers receiving deductions will
thus be required to spread the useful lives of their assets over longer
periods, for purposes of depreciation, entitling them to a smaller
depreciation deduction each year than they would have without the fifteen-
year statutorily imposed requirement. Some taxpayers would arguably
prefer the facts and circumstances approach that existed prior to revised
section 197 so that they could use shorter useful lives and correspondingly
greater annual depreciation on their intangible assets.
A possible long-term negative consequence of new section 197 is that it
might encourage leveraged buyouts. 147 Because goodwill is the value paid
for a company over and above the value of the tangible assets, companies
might buy other companies at artificially high prices and allocate the excess
14 0 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-213, supra note 139, reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1385. On this line of thought generally, see Brode, supra note 111,
at 1019-20.
141 Brode, supra note 111, at 1019 n.38.
142 Id.
143 See id.
144 Id. at 1019-20.
145 Id. at 1019.
146 Id. at 1019.
147 See Middleton, supra note 112, at 826 (arguing that prospective tax savings
will blunt criticism that the intangibles bill will encourage leveraged buyouts).
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of the value of the tangible assets to goodwill. These companies would then
take huge depreciation deductions on the acquired goodwill, costing the
government a great deal of revenue. 148 This argument is hypothetical at
present, but the possible causal link between new section 197 and corporate
takeovers will have to be watched closely.
A more theoretical concern is inextricably linked to the puzzling
concept of goodwill. Before understanding this concern, it is necessary to
explain "depreciation." The purpose of the depreciation allowance is to
permit taxpayers to recover their capital investments in wasting assets as a
charge against income earned by the assets. 149 By allowing for depreciation
deductions, taxpayers are not taxed on the return of their capital.' 5 0 The
depreciation deduction is based on the fact that most types of property
reach a point where they are no longer useful because of wear and tear
through time. 151
Recall that goodwill is characterized as the expectancy of continued
customer patronage.' 52 Goodwill is based upon a continuous course of
dealing that is expected to continue over an indefinite period of time. 153
Traditionally goodwill was not depreciable because its useful life cannot be
ascertained with reasonable certainty.154
In Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States,155 the Court stated
that any asset that has a limited useful life and an ascertainable value is, by
definition, not goodwill. 156 The Newark Morning Ledger decision did
nothing to alter this traditional characterization of goodwill. Goodwill is
not the type of thing, like a piece of equipment, whose value necessarily
diminishes over time.
148 House members in the Conservative Democratic Forum sent a letter to other
House members claiming that House Bill 13 (the predecessor bill to revised section
197) would subsidize "'new mergers and acquisitions activity by allowing one
company to buy another at inflated prices and take huge deductions at taxpayer
expense.'" David S. Hilzenrath, Congress Targets Cinton Tax Plan: Major Revisions
Are Expected, WASH. PosT, Apr. 21, 1993, at F3.
149 5 MERTENS, supra note 4, at § 23A.03.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
153 Dubin, supra note 18, at 931.
154 5 MERTENS, supra note 4, at § 23A.03.
155 113 S. Ct. 1670, 1680 (1993).
156 Id. at 1680 n.13. For a more detailed discussion of this point, see supra text
accompanying notes 93-95.
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Insofar as revised Code section 197 allows for the depreciation or
amortization of goodwill over a fifteen-year period,157 it fails to adhere to
the general purpose behind the depreciation deduction. To permit taxpayers
to recover their capital investments through depreciation deductions on
assets that, by their very nature, do not diminish in value through time, is
disingenuous. Applying the term "depreciation" to "goodwill" simply
violates the traditional meanings of these terms. The revision to section
197 appears to have been dictated by practical rather than theoretical
concerns.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The depreciation of intangible assets has caused a great deal of
controversy between taxpayers and the Service. Although taxpayers argued
that these assets were depreciable, the Service argued that these assets were
indistinguishable from goodwill and thus nondepreciable. Applying the
two-part Houston Chronicle test, courts focused on the particular facts and
circumstances of each case, often reaching apparently inconsistent results.
In Newark Morning Ledger, the Supreme Court clarified the issue, but still
left some uncertainty regarding the precedential value of its decision to
future intangibles cases.
Section 197 of the Internal Revenue Code makes some strides in
resolving the dispute, because it creates no distinction between goodwill
and intangible assets for tax purposes. Providing for a uniform fifteen-year
depreciation period for goodwill and other intangible assets, the Code
arguably imposes certainty and predictability, and encourages the equal
treatment of similarly situated taxpayers.
Although section 197 offers a number of practical advantages, it suffers
from a major theoretical drawback. Having no support in either historical
case law or the Supreme Court's recent decision in Newark Morning
Ledger Co. for allowing goodwill to be depreciated over a fifteen-year
period, Congress dramatically changed the landscape regarding the
depreciation of intangibles. The theoretical inconsistency in Congress'
revision, although probably outweighed by practical advantages, must be
acknowledged because of the wide and long-term impact of section 197.
157 I.R.C. § 197(a), (d) (West Supp. 1994).
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